These are my collections of short essays about short, philosophical dialogues. Download them for free here:
| short_essays_short_dialogues.odt |
Philosophy Now, Issue 119 – On Sympathy: A Dream Dialogue
This is a letter I sent to Philosophy Now regarding their short dialogue regarding morality. I also mentioned the recent news that intelligent children are no more moral – I am unsure of the possible biases behind the experiment.
Dear Editor,
I really enjoy the fiction sections, as they are nice, easy reads that make you think. Here I am unsure of the purpose of Ignorance I was unsure of what to think of Ignorance, and, as I am now reading Republic (I am a beginner in philosophy), I could see I few parallels between Socrates and Ignorance. Ignorance states, 'I don't know why I should have sympathy.'. Much like Socrates, this could be ignorance just playing the sceptic (as Socrates often does proclaim himself to be ignorant). Early in Republic, Socrates says something similarly sceptic saying that he does not know what justice is - here he is presumably doing this to confess his lack of certainty and allow the other person to speak his point of view. On the other hand, he could be ignorant for another reason - he is apathetic, and does not care. However, this is taken up later in the speech by apathy, so one would think it cannot be that.
As the writer of this story seems to disapprove of ignorance (I am assuming that one would consider the first kind of ignorance bad and the second kind good), I was thinking of making this distinction. Ignorance is the lack of knowledge on the subject due to apathy and Apathy is a lack of caring, yet it still has knowledge. Instead of Apathy being a twin, it really should be a triplet.
Regarding Justice, the earlier news article stating that brighter kids are 'no more moral' could indicate a basic case against justice. If assume that people who use Reason are more intelligent (this is an assumption, but it is intuitively thought, so I'll just assume it's true - but you could argue it's not), then, according the new story, people who use Reason, and therefore justice, are less moral. I wonder what standard the psychologists used to indicate moral standards - maybe they were biased against utilitarianism, of which focuses more on Reason and justice (the greatest happiness for the greatest number focuses on fairness, and therefore justice).
Ashton Hennessy
England
The God Delusion By Richard Dawkins – A Short, Satirical Dialogue
In 'The God Delusion', Richard Dawkins does a satirical dialogue regarding the Ontological Argument, and here I want to analyze it. I'm looking at the 10th Anniversary Edition, so that might alter some page numbers here and there, and he stated that he corrected some minor errors.
Chapter 3, Page 104 - 'Let me translate this infantile argument into its appropriate language, which is the language of the playground:
-'Bet you I can prove God exists.'
-'Bet you can't.'
-'Right then, imagine the most perfect perfect perfect (the final perfect is italicized) thing possible.'
-'Okay, now what?'
-'Now, is that perfect perfect (italicized) perfect thing real? Does it exist?'
-'No, it's only in my mind.'
-'But if it was real it would be even more perfect, because a really perfect thing is better than a silly old imaginary thing. So I've proved that God exists. Nur Nurny Nur Nur. All atheists are fools.'
I had my childish wiseacre choose the word 'fools' advisedly.'
One might complain that Dawkins is not very charitable towards this argument, but the lack of respect is more aesthetic than anything else. He shows clear contempt towards the argument, and one might proclaim this offensive - in the introduction of his book, however, he debunks a criticism of another phrase for its lack of respect by saying it was more satirical, rather than a serious jab*. I think the same can be said here, with him trying to add good-natured humour rather than scar the argument permanently, as the details of the argument are (though it could be argued crudely) correct. Besides, although this argument might offend some apologist’s aesthetic tastes, Dawkins states that the argument itself offends his, as he disapproves of using simple wordplay to prove something as grand as God. An eye for an eye.
Perhaps this is why he portrays it as childish. Obviously, wordplay is insignificant (he compared it to Achilles and the Tortoise**) compared to God, and he thinks that it is that of a child - by making it a playground argument, he contrasts it with the 'adult' scientific arguments of evolution, which have a wealth of evidence. His focus on the aesthetics of the argument is interesting, as earlier in the book he focuses on the aesthetics of evolution***, showing how scientists have developed appreciation of Nature via Naturalism and Pantheism (which he describes as 'sexed up atheism'**** - by 'sexed-up' I think he means 'more aesthetically pleasing', but he seems to disapprove of it).
He also highlights the absurdity of God by calling him 'the most perfect perfect perfect thing possible'. The lack of commas and grammar, again hints at childishness, and by highlighting the absurdity of the idea of God, he could be hinting at the fact that the burden of proof lies on the believer*****. He also said that he childishly yet carefully referred to atheists as fools: indicating, again, how childish the argument is aesthetically (Anselm calls the atheist 'the fool), and indicating how he precisely chose that word.
In the argument, the atheist is shown neutrally, simply following the arguments to their end. I am unsure whether Dawkins meant to say that he, too, was childish to follow the argument (with them both being in the playground, it can be assumed they were both children), or if he was a smarter child being forced to follow the smart-aleck. I think it is the latter, as the child indicates scepticism of the argument with him saying 'Bet you can't' and 'Okay, now what?' impatiently, but this could be interpreted both ways, as him saying 'bet you can't' is a bit immature. I think it can be thought both ways. He is probably just a naive child - not stupid - but gullible enough to follow the arguments. This would also connect with NOMA******, where the scientists grudgingly (and wrongly, according to Dawkins) agreed that certain arguments are best covered by religion - even prayer studies, which could be (and was) covered scientifically.
References:
* Preface to the Paperback Edition, Page 17 says that he intended it to be humorous, rather than be offensive. Here he was referring to Chapter 2, Page 51.
** Chapter 3, Page 105-106 compares this to Zeno's Paradox - it didn't stop the Greeks from believing in movement!
*** Chapter 1, Page 32 describes Charles Darwin's entangled bank, and quotes directly from 'On the Origin of Species'.
**** They talk Einstein's Pantheism at Chapter 1, Page 36-41, and Naturalism at Chapter 1, Page 34. They called Pantheism 'sexed-up' at Chapter 1, Page 40.
***** They talk about the burden of proof and Russel's Teapot at Chapter 2, Page 74-76.
****** They talk about NOMA (the use of science to cover fact, and religion to cover moral issues), at Chapter 2, Page 77-85, and The Great Prayer experiment at Pages 85-90
Republic By Plato – Conversations with Cephalus
Needless to say, Republic is one of Plato's masterworks, and therefore I am going to do an analysis of it. In this section, Socrates, of whom is the protagonist of this book, is discussing the pleasures of old age with Cephalus. You could think of me as a second-order Socrates - a debater in my own right - picking apart the arguments and trying to clarify the arguments, much like Socrates in the book. I will later compile these (much like what I am doing with my review on Meditations), into a collection of essay, and put them available for download on the front page my website (also a work in progress!). The references will be based on the Penguin's Classics translation, as this is the one I have.
Book 1, Page Five: '(Cephalus:) "Old age really does bring a lot of peace from things like sex, a lot of freedom; when the desires slacken off and cease to exercise us, it really is as Sophocles said - we're freed from a whole collect of slave masters, all of them raving mad. But there's only one thing to blame in all this, and for the trouble in family members, and that's not old age Socrates; it's the way people are. If they're well balanced and even-tempered, then old age is not too hard to bear either; if they're not, then for people like that it's not just old age that will be tough, Socrates, but youth too." (Socrates is narrating) This response struck me as admirable; and, wanting him to go on talking, I tried to provoke him: [. . .]'
When he says that desires 'cease to exercise us', there could be multiple meanings for the word 'exercise'. He could mean they cease to have an affect on us (by not having an effect - they don't make us put in an effort, or, in other words, exercise to serve them), and by saying that in a positive light, portray them as a waste of time and energy. On the other hand, he could mean they make him exercise - it's the thing that motivates him. In this, old age is positive, as now he find goods in pleasures such as good conversation.
You also state that the problem of desires is not formed by old age, but the way people are. He judges how old age is by whether you a good man or an evil man. You are good (so he says) if you are well balanced, as then you don't over-indulge in your desires. This is actually a prelude for the later argument that good men have the best life and bad men have the worst life*: men who live off their desires eventually lose them, and end up miserable; good men who find pleasures of being balanced enjoy a good life right until the end. However, Cephalus does not explain why the youth will be hard, thus leaving space open for Socrates to further explain why the life of an unjust man is unhappy.
Further evidence for this being a prelude for the later point (of which is near the end of Book 1 - a full circle) of unjust men having unjust lives is Socrates's reaction to the incident. He saw his speech as 'somewhat admirable': 'somewhat' expresses uncertainty about his thoughts - a core attitude of Socrates, and a hint for further arguments of this point (both is his reply after this, and his further arguments at the end for an unjust man's life to be bad); admirable means that Socrates likes the speech overall.
At this start of the book it also expresses Socrates's questioning nature, with the book almost saying that because he liked the speech, he wanted to go on further - he didn't want to just leave it there. Whenever he found a good point, he wanted to understand it further. Although it is a minor point, it does show signs early in the book of the Socratic Method coming into fruition.
Also, the use of the word 'provoke' is an interesting choice - it indicates angering another person, of which a good, 'even-tempered person' would not want to do. Socrates presumably agreed that a good man should be even tempered by his approval of the speech. I have two solutions: either by 'provoke' he meant it in the context of a good, meaning propel him into further discussion, or (and this is the least likely) it could mean he wanted to test Cephalus's even-temperedness (he might of been uncertain of how good Cephalus was - evidence for this is the 'somewhat' in him describing the speech as 'somewhat admirable' - expressing uncertainty).
Book 1, Page 6: Socrates: '"I imagine that when you say what you just said, most people refuse to accept it, preferring to suppose that you so easily put up with being old, not because of the kind of person you are, but rather because of the great wealth you've accumulated; rich people, they say, have plenty to comfort them"'
Now, one thing that I have to criticize Socrates for is his clear signs of bias against the point he is making, using language such as: 'I imagine' - although this could be Socrates expressing uncertainty (as he thinks one should always do) and 'preferring to suppose', meaning they don't actually think that, they would just like to think that, indicating bias against those people. Him also going on a speech on what other people think, rather then just using it as a criticism of his own infers that he himself doesn't think it is true. Later in the book, Glaucon and his brother also use a similar bias, arguing against justice despite believing, which - worryingly, in my opinion - Socrates approves of**.
The argument the people use is similar to the one that the elderly moan about loss of the pleasures such as sex and family, and Cephalus blames that on the way people are. You could make a similar point here, saying people who desire material things will find old age hard. However, it seems Socrates and Cephalus have a baseline for what people can suffer through, as later the text Cephalus agrees that the good man with no money will find old age hard.
This is also an interesting way to 'provoke' Cephalus. I think he is trying to do it as a just man should, doing it politely as not to cause offense.
References:
* Book 1, Page 41 is the end of this argument, with Socrates stating that the good man lives the best life.
This is a letter I sent to Philosophy Now regarding their short dialogue regarding morality. I also mentioned the recent news that intelligent children are no more moral – I am unsure of the possible biases behind the experiment.
Dear Editor,
I really enjoy the fiction sections, as they are nice, easy reads that make you think. Here I am unsure of the purpose of Ignorance I was unsure of what to think of Ignorance, and, as I am now reading Republic (I am a beginner in philosophy), I could see I few parallels between Socrates and Ignorance. Ignorance states, 'I don't know why I should have sympathy.'. Much like Socrates, this could be ignorance just playing the sceptic (as Socrates often does proclaim himself to be ignorant). Early in Republic, Socrates says something similarly sceptic saying that he does not know what justice is - here he is presumably doing this to confess his lack of certainty and allow the other person to speak his point of view. On the other hand, he could be ignorant for another reason - he is apathetic, and does not care. However, this is taken up later in the speech by apathy, so one would think it cannot be that.
As the writer of this story seems to disapprove of ignorance (I am assuming that one would consider the first kind of ignorance bad and the second kind good), I was thinking of making this distinction. Ignorance is the lack of knowledge on the subject due to apathy and Apathy is a lack of caring, yet it still has knowledge. Instead of Apathy being a twin, it really should be a triplet.
Regarding Justice, the earlier news article stating that brighter kids are 'no more moral' could indicate a basic case against justice. If assume that people who use Reason are more intelligent (this is an assumption, but it is intuitively thought, so I'll just assume it's true - but you could argue it's not), then, according the new story, people who use Reason, and therefore justice, are less moral. I wonder what standard the psychologists used to indicate moral standards - maybe they were biased against utilitarianism, of which focuses more on Reason and justice (the greatest happiness for the greatest number focuses on fairness, and therefore justice).
Ashton Hennessy
England
The God Delusion By Richard Dawkins – A Short, Satirical Dialogue
In 'The God Delusion', Richard Dawkins does a satirical dialogue regarding the Ontological Argument, and here I want to analyze it. I'm looking at the 10th Anniversary Edition, so that might alter some page numbers here and there, and he stated that he corrected some minor errors.
Chapter 3, Page 104 - 'Let me translate this infantile argument into its appropriate language, which is the language of the playground:
-'Bet you I can prove God exists.'
-'Bet you can't.'
-'Right then, imagine the most perfect perfect perfect (the final perfect is italicized) thing possible.'
-'Okay, now what?'
-'Now, is that perfect perfect (italicized) perfect thing real? Does it exist?'
-'No, it's only in my mind.'
-'But if it was real it would be even more perfect, because a really perfect thing is better than a silly old imaginary thing. So I've proved that God exists. Nur Nurny Nur Nur. All atheists are fools.'
I had my childish wiseacre choose the word 'fools' advisedly.'
One might complain that Dawkins is not very charitable towards this argument, but the lack of respect is more aesthetic than anything else. He shows clear contempt towards the argument, and one might proclaim this offensive - in the introduction of his book, however, he debunks a criticism of another phrase for its lack of respect by saying it was more satirical, rather than a serious jab*. I think the same can be said here, with him trying to add good-natured humour rather than scar the argument permanently, as the details of the argument are (though it could be argued crudely) correct. Besides, although this argument might offend some apologist’s aesthetic tastes, Dawkins states that the argument itself offends his, as he disapproves of using simple wordplay to prove something as grand as God. An eye for an eye.
Perhaps this is why he portrays it as childish. Obviously, wordplay is insignificant (he compared it to Achilles and the Tortoise**) compared to God, and he thinks that it is that of a child - by making it a playground argument, he contrasts it with the 'adult' scientific arguments of evolution, which have a wealth of evidence. His focus on the aesthetics of the argument is interesting, as earlier in the book he focuses on the aesthetics of evolution***, showing how scientists have developed appreciation of Nature via Naturalism and Pantheism (which he describes as 'sexed up atheism'**** - by 'sexed-up' I think he means 'more aesthetically pleasing', but he seems to disapprove of it).
He also highlights the absurdity of God by calling him 'the most perfect perfect perfect thing possible'. The lack of commas and grammar, again hints at childishness, and by highlighting the absurdity of the idea of God, he could be hinting at the fact that the burden of proof lies on the believer*****. He also said that he childishly yet carefully referred to atheists as fools: indicating, again, how childish the argument is aesthetically (Anselm calls the atheist 'the fool), and indicating how he precisely chose that word.
In the argument, the atheist is shown neutrally, simply following the arguments to their end. I am unsure whether Dawkins meant to say that he, too, was childish to follow the argument (with them both being in the playground, it can be assumed they were both children), or if he was a smarter child being forced to follow the smart-aleck. I think it is the latter, as the child indicates scepticism of the argument with him saying 'Bet you can't' and 'Okay, now what?' impatiently, but this could be interpreted both ways, as him saying 'bet you can't' is a bit immature. I think it can be thought both ways. He is probably just a naive child - not stupid - but gullible enough to follow the arguments. This would also connect with NOMA******, where the scientists grudgingly (and wrongly, according to Dawkins) agreed that certain arguments are best covered by religion - even prayer studies, which could be (and was) covered scientifically.
References:
* Preface to the Paperback Edition, Page 17 says that he intended it to be humorous, rather than be offensive. Here he was referring to Chapter 2, Page 51.
** Chapter 3, Page 105-106 compares this to Zeno's Paradox - it didn't stop the Greeks from believing in movement!
*** Chapter 1, Page 32 describes Charles Darwin's entangled bank, and quotes directly from 'On the Origin of Species'.
**** They talk Einstein's Pantheism at Chapter 1, Page 36-41, and Naturalism at Chapter 1, Page 34. They called Pantheism 'sexed-up' at Chapter 1, Page 40.
***** They talk about the burden of proof and Russel's Teapot at Chapter 2, Page 74-76.
****** They talk about NOMA (the use of science to cover fact, and religion to cover moral issues), at Chapter 2, Page 77-85, and The Great Prayer experiment at Pages 85-90
Republic By Plato – Conversations with Cephalus
Needless to say, Republic is one of Plato's masterworks, and therefore I am going to do an analysis of it. In this section, Socrates, of whom is the protagonist of this book, is discussing the pleasures of old age with Cephalus. You could think of me as a second-order Socrates - a debater in my own right - picking apart the arguments and trying to clarify the arguments, much like Socrates in the book. I will later compile these (much like what I am doing with my review on Meditations), into a collection of essay, and put them available for download on the front page my website (also a work in progress!). The references will be based on the Penguin's Classics translation, as this is the one I have.
Book 1, Page Five: '(Cephalus:) "Old age really does bring a lot of peace from things like sex, a lot of freedom; when the desires slacken off and cease to exercise us, it really is as Sophocles said - we're freed from a whole collect of slave masters, all of them raving mad. But there's only one thing to blame in all this, and for the trouble in family members, and that's not old age Socrates; it's the way people are. If they're well balanced and even-tempered, then old age is not too hard to bear either; if they're not, then for people like that it's not just old age that will be tough, Socrates, but youth too." (Socrates is narrating) This response struck me as admirable; and, wanting him to go on talking, I tried to provoke him: [. . .]'
When he says that desires 'cease to exercise us', there could be multiple meanings for the word 'exercise'. He could mean they cease to have an affect on us (by not having an effect - they don't make us put in an effort, or, in other words, exercise to serve them), and by saying that in a positive light, portray them as a waste of time and energy. On the other hand, he could mean they make him exercise - it's the thing that motivates him. In this, old age is positive, as now he find goods in pleasures such as good conversation.
You also state that the problem of desires is not formed by old age, but the way people are. He judges how old age is by whether you a good man or an evil man. You are good (so he says) if you are well balanced, as then you don't over-indulge in your desires. This is actually a prelude for the later argument that good men have the best life and bad men have the worst life*: men who live off their desires eventually lose them, and end up miserable; good men who find pleasures of being balanced enjoy a good life right until the end. However, Cephalus does not explain why the youth will be hard, thus leaving space open for Socrates to further explain why the life of an unjust man is unhappy.
Further evidence for this being a prelude for the later point (of which is near the end of Book 1 - a full circle) of unjust men having unjust lives is Socrates's reaction to the incident. He saw his speech as 'somewhat admirable': 'somewhat' expresses uncertainty about his thoughts - a core attitude of Socrates, and a hint for further arguments of this point (both is his reply after this, and his further arguments at the end for an unjust man's life to be bad); admirable means that Socrates likes the speech overall.
At this start of the book it also expresses Socrates's questioning nature, with the book almost saying that because he liked the speech, he wanted to go on further - he didn't want to just leave it there. Whenever he found a good point, he wanted to understand it further. Although it is a minor point, it does show signs early in the book of the Socratic Method coming into fruition.
Also, the use of the word 'provoke' is an interesting choice - it indicates angering another person, of which a good, 'even-tempered person' would not want to do. Socrates presumably agreed that a good man should be even tempered by his approval of the speech. I have two solutions: either by 'provoke' he meant it in the context of a good, meaning propel him into further discussion, or (and this is the least likely) it could mean he wanted to test Cephalus's even-temperedness (he might of been uncertain of how good Cephalus was - evidence for this is the 'somewhat' in him describing the speech as 'somewhat admirable' - expressing uncertainty).
Book 1, Page 6: Socrates: '"I imagine that when you say what you just said, most people refuse to accept it, preferring to suppose that you so easily put up with being old, not because of the kind of person you are, but rather because of the great wealth you've accumulated; rich people, they say, have plenty to comfort them"'
Now, one thing that I have to criticize Socrates for is his clear signs of bias against the point he is making, using language such as: 'I imagine' - although this could be Socrates expressing uncertainty (as he thinks one should always do) and 'preferring to suppose', meaning they don't actually think that, they would just like to think that, indicating bias against those people. Him also going on a speech on what other people think, rather then just using it as a criticism of his own infers that he himself doesn't think it is true. Later in the book, Glaucon and his brother also use a similar bias, arguing against justice despite believing, which - worryingly, in my opinion - Socrates approves of**.
The argument the people use is similar to the one that the elderly moan about loss of the pleasures such as sex and family, and Cephalus blames that on the way people are. You could make a similar point here, saying people who desire material things will find old age hard. However, it seems Socrates and Cephalus have a baseline for what people can suffer through, as later the text Cephalus agrees that the good man with no money will find old age hard.
This is also an interesting way to 'provoke' Cephalus. I think he is trying to do it as a just man should, doing it politely as not to cause offense.
References:
* Book 1, Page 41 is the end of this argument, with Socrates stating that the good man lives the best life.
